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Abstract
This paper begins by describing a universally recurring socio-cultural ‘game’ of inter-group competition for control
of resources. It next describes efforts to author software agents able to play the game as real humans would – which
suggests the ability to study alternative ways to influence them, observe PMESII effects, and potentially understand
how best to alter the outcomes of potential conflict situations. These agents are unscripted, but use their decision
making to react to events as they unfold and to plan out responses. For each agent, a software called PMFserv
operates its perception and runs its physiology and personality/value system to determine fatigue and hunger,
injuries and related stressors, grievances, tension buildup, impact of rumors and speech acts, emotions, and various
collective and individual action decisions. The paper wraps up with a correspondence test from a SE Asian ethnic
conflict, the results of which indicate significant correlation between real and agent-based outcomes.
Keywords: Leaders and followers; spread of ideas; strategy games; personality and culture, agent-based simulation
1) Introduction and Purpose
Gaming and simulation of socio-cultural groups is a newly evolving field, motivated by the need to better
understand how leaders and followers behave, what motivates them, how dangerous ideas spread, and how they
might be influenced to cooperate, mitigate conflicts, and benefit the overall good. Green and Armstrong (2003)
study the array of methods for forecasting conflict and show that predictions are significantly improved when
subjects first participate in role playing games about the issues at stake. Hence, one aim of this research is to isolate
the components needed for a generic role playing game to be used to rapidly mock up a class of conflicts commonly
encountered in today’s world. In other words, create a widely applicable game generator. Since it is often impossible
to find humans to play all the roles of such games, or to play out all the possible scenarios, a second aim is to create
plausible models of leaders and followers based first principles about what makes them tick and so they may play
some of the roles in the game. If these cognitive agents are realistic, they can help trainees and analysts explore the
range of their possible actions under varieties of conditions, thereby helping others to see more clearly how to
influence them and elicit their cooperation.
It is a human tendency to project our own value systems upon others and presume they want the same things we
want (the mirror bias). Once we form such hypotheses, we tend to look only for confirming evidence and ignore
disconfirming facts (the confirmation bias). Heuer (1999) points out that it is vital to break through these and related
biases, and that methodical approaches such as realistic simulations, if well done, might help to elucidate and
explore alternative competing hypotheses of agents’ motivations, intentions and consequent behavior. Thus
generation and testing of new hypotheses is a third aim, and another potential benefit of simulations.
1.1) Socio-Cultural Game Theory
How can an analyst or trainee devise policies that will influence groups for the collective good? And what must
a socio-cultural game generator encompass? Figure 1, explained below, attempts to portray a fairly universal class of
leader-follower game that groups often find themselves in and that are worthy of simulation studies. This could be
for competing groups in a crowd, in an organization, in a region or nation, or even between nations. Analysts would
need an appropriate suite of editors and a generator, to help them rapidly mock up such conflict scenarios and
analyze what outcomes arise from different courses of action/policies. We describe this game intuitively here and
more formally in Appendix I.
Specifically, the socio-cultural game centers on agents who belong to one or more groups and their
affinities to the norms, sacred values, and inter-relational practices (e.g., language, gestures, social rituals) of those
groups. Specifically, let us suppose there are N groups in the region of interest, where each group has a leader
archetype and two follower archetypes (loyalists & fringe members). We will say more about archetypes shortly,
and there can certainly be multiple leaders and followers, but we stick in this discussion to the smallest subset that
still allows one to consider beliefs and affinities of members and their migration to more or less radical positions.
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There is an editable list of norms/value systems from which each group’s identity is drawn. The range across the
base of Figure 1 shows an example of a political spectrum for such a list, but these could just as easily be different
parties in a common political system, diverse clans of a tribe, different groups at a crowd event, and so on. Each
entry on this list contains a set of properties and conditions that define the group, its practices, and entry/egress
stipulations. The authority of the leader in each group is also indicated by a similarly edited list depicted
illustratively across the top of Figure 1.
The vast majority of conflicts throughout history ultimately center around the control of resources available to a
group and its members. Before delving into our model, we invite the reader to take a look at a stylized resource
control game through game theoretic framework, as set up in the Appendix 1. The inspiration for this stylized game
comes from Wood’s (2003) civil war settlements paper. This game theoretic exercise not only gives you a 5000ft
view, but also illustrates why and how deep models such as ours will be useful. While a number of assumptions
made by the game theoretic frameworks are defensible (well-ordered preferences, transitivity), others are meant for
mathematical elegance. Without assumptions doing most of the “heavy lifting”, it is impossible develop
mathematically tractable models (De Marchi, 2005).
Many of these stylized game models are unable to encode domain information, particularly the depth of the
social system. For example, human value systems are almost always assumed, hidden, or at the best, shrunk for the
purpose of mathematical elegance. Yet, human behavior is vital to the conflict-cooperative game behavior.
While mathematical convenience is one explanation, there is more involved. Many modeling platforms would
simply not allow value systems to be made explicit, and there is no modeling process that would allow one to revisit
the values. As computational power increases to accommodate more complex models, social system modelers are
beginning to address this curse of simplicity.
Even though such models can not be solved mathematically, we can find solutions through validated simulation
models with deep agents. If one could find clusters of parameters that pertain to a corresponding game model, we
can also start talking about correspondence between game theoretic models and cognitively deep simulation models.
There is room for a lot of synergy.
Now, let us return to the cognitively detailed game. The resources of each group are illustrated along the left
side of Figure 1 and are summarized for brevity into three tanks that serve as barometers of the health of that aspect
of the group’s assets – (1) political goods available to the members (jobs, money, foodstuffs, training, healthcare
etc.); (2) rule of law applied in the group as well as level and type of security available to impose will on other
groups; and (3) popularity and support for the leadership as voted by its members. Querying a tank in a culture game
will return current tank level and the history of transactions or flows of resources (in/out), who committed that
transaction, when, and why (purpose of transactional event).
To start a game, there are initial alignments coded manually, though these will evolve dynamically as play
unfolds. Specifically, each group leader, in turn, examines the group alignments and notices Loyal Ingroup (A),
Resistant Outgroup (C), and those “undecideds” in middle (B) who might be turned into allies. Also, if there are
other groups, they are examined to determine how they might be enlisted to help influence or defend against the outgroup and whatever alliance it may have formed. Followers’ actions are to support their leader’s choices or to
migrate toward another group they believe better serves their personal value system. Actions available to Leader of
A are listed in the table on the right side of Figure 1 as either speech acts (spin/motivate, threaten, form pact, brag)
or more physical/political acts. Of the latter, there are 6 categories of strategic actions. The middle two tend to be
used most heavily by stable, peaceful groups for internal growth and development. The upper two are economic and
militaristic enterprises and campaigns taken against other groups, while the lower two categories of actions are
defensive ones intended to barricade, block, stymie the inroads of would be attackers. The right hand column of the
action table lists examples of specific actions under each of these categories – the exact list will shift depending on
whether the game is for a population, organizational, or small group scenario. In any case, these actions require the
spending of resources in the tanks, with proceeds going to fill other tanks. Thus the culture game is also a resource
allocation problem. Leaders who choose successful policies will remain in power, provide benefits for their
followers, and ward off attackers. Analysts and trainees interacting with this game will have similar constraints to
their policies and action choices.
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Figure 1 – Overview of the Basic Leader-Follower Game within CultureSim (* - editable list)
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The lead author spent much of 2004 assembling a paper-based version of Figure 1 as a role playing diplomacy
game and play-testing it with analysts: Silverman, Rees et al (2005). The goal of the game is to help players to
experience what the actual leaders are going through, and thereby to broaden and deepen their understanding, help
with idea generation, and sensitize them to nuances of influencing leaders in a given scenario. The mechanics of the
game place the player at the center of the action and play involves setting objectives, figuring out campaigns,
forming alliances when convenient, backstabbing when necessary. This is in the genre of the Diplomacy or Risk
board games, though unlike Diplomacy, its rapidly reconfigurable to any world conflict scenario.
After completing the mechanics and play-testing, three implementations of the game were created: (1) a
software prototype called LeaderSim (or Lsim) that keeps world scenarios and action sets to the simplest possible so
that we can easily build and test all of the core ideas of the theory; (2) a scaled up version called Athena’s Prism that
has been delivered as a fully functioning computer game in mid 2005, though AI opponent features are continually
being added; and (3) a streamlined version of the paper-based game has been turned into a boardgame called
BigWig© to appear at toy stores in early 2007 and aimed at being played to conclusion within an hour (it is thus
intended to serve as an intro to the diplomatic strategy genre for new players).
In general, when humans play the game, they rapidly evolve a portfolio of strategies that they tend to pursue
asynchronously and in parallel, where a strategy is a high level goal that might be implemented by any of a number
of alternative actions. An ‘action’ is defined as a sequence of low level moves governed by the rules of the game.
There are only a few moves (e.g., tap/untap tokens, re-assign tokens to resources, etc.). This portfolio or strategyaction-move hierarchies tend to reflect the culture and personality of the leader in a scenario as they attempt to
navigate the ‘game’ against the other players.
For the AI to be able to replace a human player and to assemble and manage a portfolio in a way as to
reasonably emulate a world leader, a number of components are required in the mind of the agent as shown as the
next few subsections amplify. In particular, Performance Moderator Function Server (PMFserv) is a human behavior
modeling framework that manages an agent’s perceptions, stress and coping style, personality and culture, social
relationships, and emotional reactions and affective reasoning about the world: Silverman et al.(2002a,b, 2005,
2006a,b).

2) Agent Personality, Emotions, Culture, and Reactions
In LeaderSim, each leader is modeled within a framework known as PMFserv (Silverman 2005) where the
leader’s cultural values and personality traits represented through a Goals, Standards and Preferences (GSP) tree.
These are multi-attribute value structures where each tree node is weighted with Bayesian importance weights. A
Preference Tree is one’s long term desires for world situations and relations (e.g., no weapons of mass destruction,
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stop global warming, etc.) that may or may not be achieved in the scope of a scenario. In Lsim agents this translates
into a weighted hierarchy of territories and constituencies (e.g., no tokens of leader X in resource Y of territory Z).
When faced with complex decision spaces, different individuals will pursue different long-term strategies which,
mathematically, would be very difficult to compare objectively. Chess players, athletes, and scientists develop their
own styles for solving the types of problems they encounter. We make use of the preference structure of an agent to
account for much of this. For example, one can say that a particular chess player likes or is comfortable with certain
configurations of the pieces on the board. This allows for the expression of long-term strategic choices that are
simply a question of style or preference as to how the world should be.
The Standards Tree defines the methods a leader is willing to take to attain his/her preferences. As described in
the authors’ other writings, the Standard tree implements a personality profiling tool that is mostly Hermann traits
governing personal and cultural norms (Hermann, 1999), plus the additions of protocol vs. substance, and top level
guidelines related to Economic and Military Doctrine. Also, we add two standards from the GLOBE study (House,
2004) on scope of doing and sensitivity to life (humanitarianism). Personal, cultural, and social conventions render
inappropriate the purely Machiavellian action choices (“One shouldn’t destroy a weak ally simply because they are
currently useless”). It is within these sets of guidelines where many of the pitfalls associated with shortsighted AI
can be sidestepped. Standards (and preferences) allow for the expression of strategic mindsets. When a mother tells
her son that he shouldn’t hit people, he may not see the immediate tactical payoff of obeying. However, this bit of
maternal wisdom exists and has been passed down as a standard for behavior precisely because it is a nonintuitive
strategic choice whose payoff tends to derive from what doesn’t happen far into the future as a result. Thus, our
framework allows our agents to be saved from their shortsighted instincts in much the same way as humans often
are.
Finally, the Goal Tree covers short-term needs and motivations that implement progress toward preferences. In
the Machiavellian and Hermann-profiled world of leaders, the goal tree reduces to a duality of growing vs.
protecting the resources in one’s constituency. Expressing goals in terms of power and vulnerability provide a highfidelity means of evaluating the short-term consequences of actions. To this, Athena also adds 3 options for manage
reputation (switch from none, to mirroring, to bounded rational) instead of just mirroring in Lsim.
With GSP Trees thus structured, we believe it is possible to Bayesian weight them so that they will reflect the
portfolio and strategy choices that a given leader will tend to find attractive, a topic we return to in Section 4 of this
write-up. As a precursor to that demonstration and to further illustrate how GSP trees represent the modified
Hermann profiles, consider the right side of Figure 2. There we see the weighted GSP tree of a leader of a SE Asian
nation (name withheld at request of our sponsor) who will be called BlueLeader. Other papers discuss how the
weights may be derived so as to increase credibility: e.g., see Bharathy (2006), Silverman (2002a,b, 2006 pt.2). Here
it is more pertinent to discuss how the G-tree implements the Hermann power vs. protect trait. Beneath each
subnode that has a + sign, there are further subnodes, but under the G-tree (and P-tree) these are just long sets of
constituency resources with importance valuated weights and hence they aren’t show here. The standards or S-tree
holds most of the other Hermann traits. Likewise, there are subnodes for the intersection of In Group Bias vs.
Degree of Distrust. Openness, as mentioned earlier, is a direct replacement for two other traits, while task vs.
relationship focus is also supported. The modifications to Hermann show up as the protocol vs. substance subnodes
and the key resource specific doctrines of importance to that leader. In BlueLeader’s case, he leans heavily toward
power and growth which is also consistent with his P-tree weights on his own resources. His standards reveal him to
be dishonest, narrow in scope (self-interested), and task-oriented. While the figure does not expand the lower level
detail of all nodes, he also is insensitive to life and outgroups (he did order the harsh treatment which lead to the
slaughter of unarmed villagers).
Just to the left of the weight value on each node of the GSP trees of Figure 2 are two "reservoirs" that reflect the
current activation of success and failure of this node, respectively. These reservoirs are activated and filled by events
and states of the game world as observed by the agent. Figure 2 shows early in a game where BlueLeader, a
Buddhist, has a lot of conflicted emotions about the outgroup of Muslim villagers in the Southern provinces and
some of their demonstrations.
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Figure 2 – GSP Tree Structure, Weights and Emotional Activations for BlueLeader
In general, we propose that any of a number of k diverse activations could arise with intensity, ξ, and that this
intensity would be somehow correlated to importance of one’s GSP values or node set (GSP) and whether those
concerns succeed or fail for the state in question. We express this as

ξ k (b ∈ B) =

∑ ∑ [Wij(v ∈ V) * Φ (r ) * ζ(v )∗ ψ]
j

j∈J k

[1]

v∈V

Where,
ξk Æ ξk( b ∈ B ) = Intensity of activation, k, due to the bth state of the world.
Jk = The set of all agents and objects relevant to k. J1 is the set consisting only of the self, and J2 is the set consisting
of everyone but the self, and J is the union of J1 and J2.
W( v ∈ V ) = Weighted importance of value set V to the agent.
V = The set of goals, standards, and preferences held by the agent.
φ (rj)
= A function that captures the strength of positive and negative relationships one has with agent or object j
that are effected or spared in state b.
ζ(v) = degree of activation for a goal, standard, or preference
ψ = A function that captures temporal factors of the state and how to discount (decay) and
merge one’s GSP activations from the past (history vector), in the present, and for the future
It is important to note that the weights adhere to principles of probability; e.g., all child node insights add to
unity beneath a given parent, activations and weights are multiplied up a branch, and no child has multiple parents

© Silverman, Bharathy, Nye, 2006

5

Descartes Conference on Mathematical Models in Counterterrorism, Washington DC, 9/29/06
(independence). Although we use fixed weights on the GSP trees, the reservoirs serve to render them dynamic and
adaptive to the agent's current needs. Thus, when a given success reservoir is filled, that tends to nullify the
importance of the weight on that node (or amplify it if the failure reservoir is filled). In this fashion, one can think of
a form of spreading activation (and deactivation) across the GSP structure as the scenario proceeds.
According to other best-of-breed models (Damasio, 1994; Ortony, Clore, and Collins, 1988; etc), our emotions
are arousals on a set of values (modeled as trees) activated by situational stimuli as well as any internally-recalled
stimuli – e.g., see full descriptions of these models in Silverman et al. (2002a,b, 2006a,b).These stimuli and their
effects act as releasers of alternative emotional construals and intensity levels, and they assist the agent in
recognizing problems, potential decisions, and actions. According to the theory, the activations may variously be
thought of as emotions or subjective (moralistic) utility values, the difference being a matter of semantic labeling.
Within such a framework, simply by authoring alternative value trees, one should be able to capture the behavior of
alternative “types” of people and organizations and predict how differently they might assess the same events,
actions, and artifacts in the world around them.
2.1) Agent Decision Making
What is missing in the previous section is how an agent notices the game world, moves of others, and sense of
situation. This discussion will illustrate how this happens using one Hermann factor (power and vulnerability) as an
example. Hopefully, it is fairly straightforward for the reader to extend that to how the other factors are also
deployed. Full details exist in Johns (2006).
Central to a given leader’s G-Tree reasoning is its perceptions of who threatens it and/or whom it’s vulnerable
to. Likewise a given leader may be equally interested to estimate who can it influence to best increase its resource
assets and thereby its power in the world. Obviously, GSP tree weights will govern how aggressively a given leader
pursues each of these vulnerability vs. power concerns, however, we assume that all leader agents need to be able to
compute how vulnerable and/or powerful they are at each turn of a game. Since the game rules define precisely
which resources can be used to take hostile actions against which other resources, one can derive a measure of a
player’s vulnerability directly from the state of the game world and the rule set. Intuitively, by factoring
vulnerability into the world utility calculation, an agent can avoid world configurations in which another is poised to
conduct a devastating attack. Adding border defenses, stocking up on supplies, and pulling money out of the
economy can all be viewed as behaviors motivated primarily by vulnerability management.
The vulnerability formula (β ) works by generating the percentage of a given player’s tokens that can be
expected to be lost to a given player in the coming round of attack actions (ai). For each hostile action ( a i ∈ A )
that can be initiated by another player (g), the number of tokens available to attack and defend is tallied. From this
the probability of victory is determined, and then multiplied by the percentage of tokens vulnerable to this attack
versus the total number owned by the vulnerable player in each resource category. This is the expected percentage
of tokens to be lost if this attack occurs in the next round. The maximum over all attacks, then, gives this player ℓ’s
vulnerability score β to player y.

βxy = Max a ∈ A Pr (a )∗

σ(x, a )
C(x )

[2]

Agents who purely manage vulnerability, while interesting in their behavior, are not entirely realistic. Human
players tend to balance vulnerability against its inverse, power. Where vulnerability measures the expected number
of tokens a player can lose to other players in the coming round, power measures the expected number of tokens a
player can take from others. The calculation of the power heuristic is exactly the opposite as for vulnerability.
Player A’s vulnerability to Player B is the same as Player B’s power over Player A.
Taking the leader’s perceived difference between power and vulnerability provides a surrogate for the
leader’s overall sense of utility of the current state of the world, G, when divorced from his value system and other
factors:
Ul (Gx) = αx – βx

[3]

Recall, however, that a given leader agent (1) tracks who is aligned with whom, tallying things like trust, (2)
monitors all resource levels and who used what actions upon them, and (3) its own actions to achieve its long term
preferences or P-tree, as modulated by its standards. Thus α and β serve primarily as activations on the leaf nodes of
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some of the GSP tree branches. PMFserv uses a wide assortment of similar activation mechanics for other factors
and computes the Expected Utility (EU) of the world and of new action possibilities when projecting next steps.
That is, PMFserv serves as the point where diverse GSP personality and cultural value sets, stressors, coping style,
memories, and perceptions are all integrated into a decision for action (or inaction) to transition to a new state (or
remain in the same state) and to determine the portfolio of strategies-moves-actions that best maximize that agent’s
GSP Tree values as mfollows.

Max EU(a ) = ∑ Ul (b) ∗ pr (b)

[4]

b∈Ba

Where,
a ∈A
A = action set available after GSP and stress-constrained perception
pr(b)
= probability of action a leading to state b

u l ( b) =

∑ξ

k∈K

k

( b)
[5]

11

Utilities for next actions, ak, are derived from the activations on the GSP trees in the usual manner as in
Silverman, Johns, et al. (2002a, b) and as Silverman et al (2002a, b) and as briefly summarized for power and
vulnerability here. That is, utility is the simple summation of all positive and negative activations for an action
leading to a state. Since there will be 11 pairs of oppositely valenced activations in PMFserv’s emotion model, we
normalize the sum as follows so that utility varies between –1 and +1.
3) Modeling Follower Value Systems
We introduce three refinements in order to also be able to model the values and motivations of followers –
(1) additions to the GSP trees, (2) a group-affinity profiling instrument, and (3) group transfer dynamics (exit, voice,
and loyalty). In keeping with Aim 2, each of these refinements is an implementation of a well-respected model
drawn from the social sciences. Details are omitted, but may be found in Silverman, Bharathy et al (2006c).
Mathematically, the reader may recall φ (rij) from earlier Equation [1]. Here we examine the case where j is
a group (or leader) and the term refers to the membership, relationship, or strength of affinity of agent i to group j.
An agent i can belong to multiple groups at varying strength according to:

Φ( riA ) =

Superiority A × GSPcongruenceiA

[6]

VIDAi

where Superiority and VID are from DI instruments if available, else derived by GSP trees of agent i in reacting to
leader or group A.
Groups are characterized by GSP weights for the average of all members as well as by property lists
defined a priori (religion, political system, etc.), and GroupPorosity factors. GSP congruence is estimated using the
sum of the means square differences in the GSP nodes. GSPcongruence = 1 – Sqrt[Sum[(wi1 –wi2)^2], which is the
correlation of the weights between two GSP trees. If an agent is in Group B, it will not be drawn to a Group C
whose GSP archetype is substantially incongruent to its own. If an agent is in a group (or under control of a leader)
whose average GSP is greatly different from its own, the agents tend to use Voice to resist the leader or attempt to
Exit to another group, depending on porosity.
If agent i desires to exit from any group A to join any C, this is governed by the delta in utility of membership
in each group plus a cost factor adjusted for transfer rate or demand elasticity. If the delta is positive, or larger than
some loyalty factor, exit may occur. Let, this delta be:

∆Φi = [U (ΦC ) +
where,
U(φ)
COSTTR
TRij
=

=
=

COSTTR

TRAC

] − U (ΦA )

[7]
utility of membership, found by invoking the PMFserv emotion model and GSP trees
cost of migration, land costs, and lost opportunity costs
Transfer Rate or group porosity, a measure of ease of entry to or exit from group j for agent i.
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(TR is a negative value that grows larger as porosity grows)

TRA→C = SalienceExitA × SalienceEnterC × GSPcongruenceiC

[8]

This is the transfer rate and it varies between (0,-1). Salience is the extent to which a group permits exiting by
ingroup members, and entry by outgroup members. It is the porosity permitted by the group. There is a tuple or
value pair that gives both salienceForEntry and salienceForExit. The demand elasticity for exiting a group is 1/TR.
As the leaders did with Figure 1, the followers similarly take each set of opposing groups and place them
along a scale as shown below. The decision that the villagers make is expressed as grievance, where the grievance is
in the scale of –4 to +4 are given below (also shown are the Grievance State IDs of the simulation of Sect 4.2):
Å
Villager Decision
Æ
Sacrifice, Support,
Join
Agree
Neutral
Disagree,
Join,
Oppose,
Fight
Go on
Vote for Authority
(undecideds
Vote
Opposition
NonRebel,
Attacks
GroupA Group A
in Group B) against A
Group C
Violent
Exit A
-4.0
-3.0
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
+1.0
+2.0
+3.0
+4.0
GS0
GS1
GS2
GS3
GS4
These actions are on abstract scale, which ranges from total support of the majority that is oppressing you
(if you can’t lick them, join them), to being undecided and/or helpless in the middle, to the other extreme of
supporting and ultimately exiting A and joining the insurgency. At the extremes on either end, the agent will submit
to militaristic commands of the leader of that group, while at the next level two lower levels they will be only
willing to go to protests, and verbally and economically support the activities of that group’s leaders. Thus, every
state all the way through GS4 represent Voice. We only permit Exit from A and joining of C after occupying GS4
for a significant interval.
Figure 3 – Start and End States During the CorrespondenceTest: LeaderSim Summary View

A – Blue Land at Start of Test with Minimal
Forces in Yellow Land, Minimal Insurgency

B – By End of Test, Blue Leader has Moved
Forces to Yellow Land, Insurgency Grows

Lsim Legend: Blue = Leader and Cops/Armed Forces, Yellow = Moderates and Radicals, Red = Rebels

Figure 3 (cont’d) - Civil Violence View of Population Membership Before and After Correspondence Test

C – Starting State (Avg of Weeks 1 & 2)
D – End State (Avg of Weeks 103, 104)
Muslim Population at Start Is Neutral with Few Muslim Population Reflects Radicalization and
Grievances Registering
Spread of NonViolent and Violent Protest
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100%

100%
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4) Socio-Cultural Game Results to Date: Turing, Correspondence, and Senstivity Testing
The previous section delineated the human behavior model of leaders and followers in terms of value trees and
activation mechanics in PMFserv. Here we turn to an examination of how these archetypes work in a game. In this
Section, we exam a scenario where a larger group of one religion and its leader (Blue) discriminate against two
smaller groups (the moderate Villagers, Yellow, and the rebels, Red) of a different religion, both in terms of values
as well as overt policies. The main policy concern here will be to find out: how should Blue leader address this
problem so as to attain his own goals yet also be more tolerant and prevent a full blown insurgency from being
spawned? Why is violence rising? What are the consequences for domestic politics? What would be the best targets
and times to intervene? This case will draw training and test data from events during the past three years in SE Asia.
Only publicly available data sources have been used, but the sponsor requested this land remain unnamed, and hence
we will refer to them solely as Blue, Yellow, and Red (see Figure 3A).

Figure 4: Grievance from Simulation and Observed Data (Incident Severity)
[Training & Test Periods]
4.1) Correspondence Test
There were three types of data/ empirical information employed in this model:
• Numerical data as well as empirical materials on BlueLand, particularly the violent incidents occurring in the
rural Yellowland provinces under the control of Blue,
• Empirical information about the decisions made, along with the contexts of these decisions, by the specific
personnel being modeled (the Leader of the Blue), and
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•

Culture specific information for the Blue and Yellow from such studies as GLOBE (House et.al., 2005), as well
as religious doctrines affecting the people of concern.

During the 1990s, the country was relatively stable, however, in the last few years, the rural provinces
(YellowLand) have seen a rise of Muslim anger against the central Blue government, and the internal security
situation in these provinces has rapidly decayed. Certain factions in YellowLand are seeking independence from
BlueLand. During 2004, a small group of people, indicated as Red in Figure 3A has committed an increasing
number of violent acts against Buddhists (Blue people). The level and sophistication of the attacks has been
increasing to the point where people are questioning whether there may be outsiders assisting this group. The
reaction of the Blue Leader to these violent incidents has been generally viewed as heavy-handed, and even
inappropriate. The Blue Leader has branded the separatists as bandits, and has sent the worst behaving police from
the north (BlueLand) to handle all protesters in the YellowLand. There are many accounts of police brutality and
civilian deaths. In December 2004, the Tsunami hit and ravaged portions of YellowLand. The massive arrival of
relief workers lead to an interruption of hostilities, but these resumed in mid-2005, and Blue Leader declared martial
law over YellowLand in the summer of 2005.
The violent incidents in the country were classified based on the size and intensity of the incident. The incidents
were then aggregated and plotted against time to obtain a longitudinal plot of incidents (Figure 4). The data was then
longitudinally separated into ‘independent sets’ with training set consisting of Jan-June 2004 while test set
beginning in July 2004 and running till Dec 2004. We curtail the test data to end before the tsunami.
Setting Up The Testbed and Tuning it with the Training Dataset: Training data and evidence were used to
calibrate three types of agents in PMFserv:
• Blue Leader (structure of his GSP trees are in Fig 3) - data indicates harsh, cruel, task, corrupt, wealthy,
successful. Sends worst behaving cops down to YellowLand, never discourages brutality.
• Moderate villagers -Lack of cultural freedom, schools, etc. Want own land and autonomy.
• Radical villagers - Wahhabi and college-trained, unemployed, running religious schools in family homes.
In order to adequately test these PMFserv agents’ ability to interact at the population level, the PMFserv
run groups are connected to a cellular automata that is known as the Civil Violence model (Epstein et al., 2001),
though Leader Legitimacy is replaced with PMFserv agents’ view of membership. The Civil Violence model
involves two categories of actors, namely villagers (or simply agents) and cops. ‘Agents’ are members of the general
population of YellowLand and may be actively rebellious or not, depending on their grievances. ‘Cops’ are the
forces of the BlueLand authority, who seek out and arrest actively rebellious agents. The main purpose of
introducing the Civil Violence model is to provide a social network for the cognitively detailed PMFserv villagers to
interact with. The social network consists of one layer of the normal arena or neighborhoods as well as a second
layer of secret meeting places, simply represented as a school. Civil Violence agents can exist in more than one layer
(namely in the normal as well as school layers), however, the PMFserv agents that show up in the school layer are
only the young Wahhabi- and college-trained males.
The training data set also was used to fit the between-the-models parameters, especially between the
PMFServ and CV model bridge and to tune up the Civil Violence villagers. Specifically, three types of cellular
automata villagers were added:
• Neutral Villagers (these are modeled as simple agent automata in the CV model) -- 1,360 of them exist. The
simple villagers are uniformly distributed in terms of risk aversion, but derive their grievance from witnessing cop
activities in their neighborhood, from polling neighbors for opinions, and from hearing about hardships and news
from PMFserv agents they may be in contact within their own neighborhood or school.
• Moderate Villagers – there are 80 of these in Civil Violence who are controlled by 80 PMFserv agents. They
influence neutrals via small world theory in different neighborhoods of the Civil Violence cellular automata.
• Radical Villagers – there are 80 of these in Civil Violence who are controlled by 80 PMFserv agents. They
influence neutrals via small world theory in different neighborhoods of the civil violence cellular automata and in
the school layer.
The bridge between PMFserv and Civil Violence includes Blue Leader and 160 villagers, and works as follows.
Blue Leader examines the state of the world and makes action decisions to assist or suppress Red or Yellow (e.g.,
pay for Buddhist schools, add more cops, reduce cop brutality, etc.). The 160 PMFserv agents then assess their view
of the world, react to how cops handle protester events, how their GSPs are being satisfied or not by leader actions,
and to their emotional construals. The grievance level and group membership decisions by 160 archetypical villagers
in PMFServ are passed via an XML bridge to 160 agents they control in the cellular automata based population

© Silverman, Bharathy, Nye, 2006

10

Descartes Conference on Mathematical Models in Counterterrorism, Washington DC, 9/29/06
model. These agents influence the neutrals of the population who spread news and form their own view of the
situation. The number of Civil Violence villagers in each of the five states of the Grievance Scale (neutral through
Fight Back) are added up and this information is passed back to PMFserv to help determine its starting level of
grievance for the next cycle of reactions to Blue Leader actions. For the purposes of this writeup, the Red Group has
no active agents, but is marked up as rebels that afford activations as mentioned in Section 3.
Running the Simulation -- The correspondence test is whether the overall parameterization for the GSP tree-guided
PMFserv agents in the bridge with the Civil Violence population will faithfully mimic the test data set. That is, by
tuning the GSP trees of 1 leader and 160 villagers, and by connecting all that to the Civil Violence mode of
spreading news and grievances, do we wind up with a simulation that seems to correspond to what happened in the
real world test dataset? Specifically, we are interested in testing the null hypothesis that there is no statistically
significant correlation between real decisions and the simulated decisions. That is to say that real incidents and
simulated base case are mutually independent.
The simulation starts on the left side of Figures 4A for Lsim and 9C for Civil Violence. When the
simulation is run, one observes Blue Leader trying some assistance measures initially (usually offering to set up
Buddhist school and institutions) but maintaining a high police presence, and turning increasingly suppressive as the
run proceeds -- Suppressing by Increasing Militarization and by Increasing Violence Unleashed. The end state is
reflected in Figures 4B and D for each view, respectively. We can also examine what happened as the run
proceeded. Figure 5A shows the average PMFserv villager perceptions of the Blue Leader actions in terms of the
Dangerous Ideas model’s terms – Vulnerability, Injustice, Distrust. Initially, Moderate Villagers respond positively
to needed assistances given by the Blue Leader (negative VID and grievance is positive support). However, once
they are suppressed violently and lose faith in the government, they tend to disagree with even positive government
decisions. Radical Villagers start out disagreeing with Blue Leader and shift to ‘fight back’, an action that might
continue for a long time before they realize the helplessness of the situation and abandon membership in the
moderate side, and join the opposition.
Figure 5B shows the output of the Civil Violence model being sent back to the PMFserv villagers.
Specifically, it shows what percent of the population has been shifted from Neutral Grievance to higher states (recall
the scale of earlier Section 3): GS0 (neutral) through GS4 (fight back). From the first graph, it can be seen that at
the start, most villagers are neutral and occupy GS0 while a small percent start in GS1. Many of them rapidly shift to
GS1 (disagree), then abandon that and shift to GS2 and higher states. The occupancy in lower grievance states fall
with time, while that in higher grievance states climb. From about week 50 onwards, there is a fairly stable, though
regularly punctuated equilibrium in which the highest occupied states are GS3 and GS4. This is an indication of
progressive escalation of violence in the society.
In order to compare this simulated grievance to that of the real world, we need some reliable measures of
the population’s grievance during actual events. Unfortunately, there are no survey or attitude results available. In
the real world (test) dataset, the incident data was available, however, with a record of fatalities and injuries. There
are a number of schemes for weighting those (e.g., depression and morale loss, lost income, utility metrics, others),
however, here we take the simple approach of just computing a weighted incident severity. We computed incident
severity scores using weighted average of fatalities and injuries, where injuries are simply counted, but the weight
on fatalities is 100. IncidentSeverity = wf x fatalities + wi x injuries. The result serves to indicate how severe these
incidents were. While severity is only an indirect measure of how the population might have felt, it is a measure that
can be tested for correlation to the rise and fall of grievance expression due to leader actions in our simulated world.
To conduct the comparison, we apply the non-parametric Kendall's Tau measure of correlation. This
statistic estimates the excess of concordant over discordant pairs of data, adjusted for tied pairs. With a two sided
test, considering the possibility of concordance or discordance (akin to positive or negative correlation), we can
conclude that there is a statistically significant lack of independence between base case simulation and observed
grievances rankings at a confidence interval of 88%. Since there is a probabilistic outcome determining if a
simulated leader’s action choice will result in injury and fatality incidents (and how the news of these events are
propagated through the cellular automata is probabilistic as well), we repeated the simulation runs thirty times and
the confidence interval mentioned above is the mean across those 30 correlations. In sum, the null hypothesis is
rejected and real (test interval) incident data and simulation results are related
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Figure 5A – PMFserv Villagers View the Blue
Leader’s Actions And Communicate That to
Their Civil Violence Counterparts

Figure 5B – Percent of Civil Violence Villagers Shifting from
Neutral To Higher States of Grievance
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4.2) Validation
In order to assess the validity, we examine what transpires inside the heads of the various types of agents in
the simulated world. In the test dataset, the real world leader made 52 decisions affecting the population and that we
sorted into positive, neutral, and negative actions. In the simulated world, Blue leader made 56 action decisions in
this same interval. At this level of classification (positive, neutral, negative), we were able to calculate a mutual
information or mutual entropy (M) statistic between the real and simulated base cases. M ranges from 0 to 1.0, with
the latter indicating no correlation between two event sets X and Y.
M (X: Y) = H(X) – H(X|Y) where X and Y are the simulation and historic sources, respectively, and H (.) is the
entropy function, defined by: H(X) = - Σ p(x) i log p(x). Applying this metric, the mutual entropy values were found
to be less than 0.05, indicating correlation between real and simulated data. Details of this validation as well as
villager validation are given in the Appendix II. With an M metric, one cannot make statements about the
confidence interval of the correlation, however, the Blue Leader in the current scenario seems faithful to his real
world counterpart. This gives us reason to suspect the Hermann- and GLOBE-based GSP tree structure works
equally well across time periods, locations, and cultures.
Not all aspects of the agent mindset work as well as this, however. As an example, one would expect agents to
waiver somewhat in their resolve, yet our mechanism for that waivering seems like it may be too heavy-handed. The
reader will recall that at the end of each cycle, the XML bridge feeds average Civil Violence neighborhood
grievance back to the PMFserv agents in that neighborhood as a dampening of their reactions. This feedback is in
the form of a replacement of the PMFserv agent’s memory of past grievance level. Resetting of past grievance leads
to flip-flopping behavior of PMFserv agents. This causes moderate villagers to flip between supporting opposition
(GS2) and joining government (GS-2) depending on what Blue Leader does, particularly during the early stages.
Hence they seem overly fickle. Since radicals are more grieved, their flip-flops are between neutral (GS0) and fight
back (GS4), and this seems less troublesome semantically, though a confirmed Jihadist probably has fewer of these
issues. We are not sure if this amount of flip-flopping is warranted, and this could only be resolved by further
behavioral studies of such individuals (studies of which may be underway by Atran (2006)). If research shows them
to be less fickle in their inner beliefs, this is a relatively easy process to dampen in future versions.
4.3) Sensitivity Analysis
Once again, it is interesting to explore “what-ifs” and whether alternative decisions by Blue Leader will
yield different outcomes amongst the YellowLand population. The reader will recall, however, that our model’s
output is conflict parameters (action decisions, grievances, group membership), whereas the model’s inputs are
characteristics of the leader and the followers. To change the outputs implies shifting the weights on the GSP trees
of various archetypes of the population. Here we shift those weights for the Blue Leader, since we are interested to
see if his personal decision style and choices are key to driving the villagers toward insurgency.
• By altering Blue Leader’s InGroup Bias we should be able to alter his decisions to provide more or less
needed assistance (economic goods, non-Wahabbi schools), and then we can observe if that alters the outcome.
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Specifically, we perturb InGroup Bias on his Standards Tree by 15% in either direction. Figure 6A shows the
result.
• By altering Blue Leader’s Sensitivity to Life (Humanitarianism) we should be able to alter his decisions to
provide more or less violent cops, and then we can observe if that alters the outcome. Specifically, we perturb
SensitvityToLife on his Standards Tree by 15% in either direction. Figure 6B shows the result.
• By altering Blue Leader’s Openness we should be able to alter the immediacy of his response to opposition
and protest. Thus he would send fewer cops down to YellowLand if he were more open, and more cops if he
were less open, and then we can observe if that alters the outcome. Specifically, we perturb Openness on his
Standards Tree by 15% in either direction. Figure 6C shows the result.
In examining these three sets of what-ifs in Figures 6A-C, as expected, a larger fraction of population
occupies higher grievance states of 4 and 3, when the leader exhibits lesser degree of sensitivity-to-life and/or more
InGroup Bias. Conversely, the population remains at lower grievance states when Blue Leader is more sensitive-tolife and less InGroup Biased. However, the trend is not the same with respect to the openness trait of the leader. It
appears that more open leadership does not necessarily result in lower grievances in the community, but in less
sustained (shorter) expressions of grievance.
Figure 6A – Alternative Outcomes (Grievance
Figure 6B – Alternative Outcomes (Grievance Level) When
Level) When Altering Blue Leader InGroup Bias
Altering Blue Leader’s SensitivityToLife
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Figure 6D – The Low, Medium, and Upper Limits in Figs
6A-C Combine Into Points 1, 2, and 3 Culminating in a
Tipping From Voice to Exit and Martial Law.
These types of results help us begin to calibrate the population’s demand curve mentioned earlier for exit,
loyalty, and voice. Specifically, in Section 3 we presented several equations (equations 6-8) that help to determine
the members’ decisions about expressing their grievance (voice) and/or exiting the legitimate authority and joining
the separatist movement.
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In Figure 6D, we see the graphical expression of several of those equations. We plot loss of civil rights and growing
vulnerability, injustice, and distrust (VID) up the vertical, with group members along the horizontal. The demand
curve is negatively sloped indicating people tend to increase their strength of membership in group A (BlueLand in
this instance) as VID drops. The Transfer Rate helps to define the elasticity or slope of the demand curve. As the
policies of the Blue Leader are altered for more Sensitivity to Life and Less InGroup Bias (Figures 6B and 6A,
respectively), this is equivalent to shifting from point 2 on the demand curve toward point 1. On the other hand,
more InGroup Bias and less Sensitivity to Life shift the YellowLand to point 3. In Figure 6D, we had the means to
compute the desire to exit, and this is plotted along the horizontal axis. To the right of point 1, ∆Φ is below zero, and
few members favor the separatism. This is how YellowLand in fact was in the 1990s. In the interval between 1 and
3, the YellowLand people are indifferent since separatism cost is so high. There, they use their Voice and we
observe the protests that occurred in the simulation runs of this paper, and that in fact occurred in the real world test
dataset. Finally, to the left of point 3, Blue Leader’s treatment becomes so intolerable, that he loses the hearts of the
Yellow People and even the moderate followers are now on the side of the Red separatists or insurgents. In fact, in
late summer of 2005, the Leader of this land had to declare Martial Law complete with curfews and movement
checkpoints. The sign of our simulation results thus correspond well to the real world, and give us an ability to
suggest outcome possibilities that are realistic for the Leader’s policy choices.
5) Lessons Learned and Next Steps
In concluding, it is useful to revisit the three aims of the introduction, and to see what has been learned in each
of them and to point out some items seen as priorities for further development.
Aim 1 was to create a role-playing game generator where one could rapidly set up and play out numerous
conflict scenarios from around the world. Conflicts arise when groups vie over the control and allocation of
resources (land, economy, markets, militias, media outlets, followers, etc.). Socio-cultural aspects concern any
perceived injustices that have arisen historically with respect to these allocations, where perception is a matter of the
value systems, norms/standards, and emotional utility of the perceivers. An example of its usage can be seen in SE
Asian scenario described in this paper. The game generator was shown to reduce conflicts to the bare essentials that
allow one to explore the intertwined issues affecting welfare (economy, in-group standards, health services), security
(freedoms/liberties, military), and political support for leaders (popularity of positions).
In zero sum games, what one spends on actions affecting one area of welfare, security, or populace effects
what one has to allocate to other areas. Borrowing from diplomatic video games the idea here is to make the game
immersive and engaging, and to date hundreds of players have participated in multi-hour sessions that they were
unwilling to terminate. All this game-play also gave us a rich source of data to help guide the construction of agents
who can serve as synthetic opponents, allies, followers, and the like. Also, we have learned that our game state
representations are intuitive and that domain experts can readily use them to express conflict scenarios that are hard
to verbalize. As with anything done in software, there are always next levels of sophistication and detail that one can
add, and we identified many new features we would like to add such as, to mention a few examples, (2) scale up of
all features shown here for the larger game generator we call Athena’s Prism; (2) resources and assets (e.g.,
economy and black markets) that are supported by institutions that grow more self-sustaining and resilient, the larger
they are; and (3) logging services and explanation functions that help users to generate reports on model outcomes,
agent decision choices, and effects. These are some of the laundry list of next steps for the game generator.
Modeling leaders and followers is a complex enterprise and one would like to use only first principles of
social science, yet the field has not matured sufficiently. Still, that is no excuse for modelers to “make up” their own
rules and algorithm for how groups behave, nor is it justification to just create entertaining agents. The alterative we
explored here is to try and adopt best-of-breed and well-respected social science models for leadership, group
dynamics, and the hearts and minds of the populace (Aim 2). These models are implemented atop a unified
architecture of cognition, call PMFserv that manages six modules of an agent’s mind: memory, perception,
physiology/ stress/ coping level, value system, and emotional construal, relationships and models of other, and
(stress and emotion-constrained) decision making processes. PMFServ exposes many parameters in each of these
modules and permits analysts/developers to visually “program” best-of-breed social science models that govern how
the modules work, and in turn, how that agent tends to behave. This framework supported the ready implementation
of leader models from Hermann (style), Hofstede and Globe (cultural factors), and Heuer (biases) atop pre-existing
models in the PMFServ modules. These synthetic leaders passed the Turning and Correspondence tests, where the
leader and minority villagers attempted to maximize his respective economic welfare, security, and populace
resources in accord with his GSP trees of goals, standards, and preferences in the game scenarios. It was no surprise
that leaders’ biased models of others often proved to be self-fulfilling prophecies. The PMFServ modules allowed
group followers to be readily modeled via their personal motivations (Maslow-style), group member factors
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(injustices, vulnerabilities, etc.), and loyalty decisions (follow happily, helplessly, vocally, separate, etc.). Again the
followers’ behavior passed Turing and Correspondence tests of Muslim moderates and radicals as the outgroup
leader’s policies shifted: a real world case study was used. Our population model involved a cellular automata with
1,360 agents influenced in their neighborhoods and schools by 160 PMFserv agents. Inside the PMFserv agents,
one can readily observe and track their GSP tree implementation of Maslow, Hofstede, and GLOBE factors, and
preference functions. One can follow how they update the Eidelson model factors of group and leader achievement.
One gains confidence that these agents are realistic, particularly when one can calibrate them with validated
instruments such as Hermann’s profiling method or Eidelson’s IGBI instrument, just as is done for real world human
participants: e.g., see Moaz & Eidelson (2006).
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APPENDIX I: Stylized Game Description

Mutual conflict or fight-fight are Nash
equilibriums, as compromising while the other
player fights have a low pay off.
c3V + c3L = c3 and c3L = y.c3 and c3V = (1- y).c3
If c3V > f2V and c3L > f2L, then mutual
compromise is also a Nash equilibrium.
This zero sum game assumes, fraction y of the
total compromised divisible pay off (c3) is
allocated to the leader.

Leader

Leader

The agents in our model participate in a multi-stage, hierarchical, n-player game in which each class or type of agent
(Dx) observes and interacts with some limited subset of y agents (human or artificial) via one or more
communication modalities. We make three empirically plausible assumptions about multiple hierarchies of agents:
(1) play multiple distinct games, (2) are cognitively detailed, (3) agents are self-serving, and attempt to maximize its
utility (u) within this iteration of the game, as follows. GAME = (a ∈ A,Ux, Dx ) _ for x ∈ X ---[ A1.01]
In this case, we set it up as a game (similar to that of Wood, 2003) between the Leader of the CountryT (Leader or
L) and the minority villagers (V), who have conflicting-interests. The leader wants to divert his resources to his
constituency, thereby discriminating against this minority. If they rebel, the leader would not hesitate to use violence
(fight or f). If the leader were to compromise, he would not help his constituency in the short term (in turn may lose
some support or votes especially from extremists), but would manage to settle the conflict (compromise or c). The
outcomes are as follows for single shot and iterative games.
Single Shot:
Repeated (as negotiated solutions typically are): If future
discount rate (rate of time preference) is i for both parties,
Villager
then over infinite horizons:
Fight
Compromise
Villager
Fight f1L, f1V
f2L, 0
Fight
Compromise
f2L+ f1L.[1/i] ,
Fight f1L.(1+i)/i,
Comp 0, f2V
c3L, c3V
Comp

f1V.(1+i)/i

f1V.[1/i]

f1L. .[1/i]
f2V+ f1V.[1/i]

c3L.(1+i)/i,
c3V.(1+i)/i

Initially negotiate or fight as per single shot game.
Simultaneous, repeated game with information input
from historic events. Mutual compromise or conflict,
once established, tends to persists in the absence of
exogenous shocks. For mutual compromise,
c3L.(1+i)/i > f2L+ f1L. .[1/i] and c3V.(1+i)/i > f2V+ f1V. [1/i]

Let pLVC and pVLC be the probabilities estimated by the leader and villager
for compromising by villagers and leader respectively. Using these, one
may estimate the expected payoff for:
•
the leader to compromise as: E(LC) = pLVC * c3L.(1+i)/i + (1-pLVC) *
{f1L .[1/i]}
the villagers to compromise as: E(VC) = pVLC * c3V.(1+i)/i + (1-pVLC) *
•
{f1V.[1/i]}
Similarly, the estimated pay off for:
•
the leader to fight is: E(LF) = (1-pLVC) * {f1L.(1+i)/i}+ pLVC * {f2L+
f1L.[1/i] }
•

the villagers to fight is: E(VF) = (1-pVLC) * {f1V.(1+i)/i} + pVLC *
f1V.[1/i]}

c3L.(1+i)/i
f1L.(1+i)/i
f2L+ f1L.[1/i]
f1L. .[1/i]

{f2V+
0

pLVC*

1

Ranges of probabilities of belief required of opponent’s likelihood of compromise, over which a party will
compromise, could be obtained as shown in the figure (robust equilibriums with symmetry). While such stylized
games are useful to elegantly illustrate the division of tangible and divisible resources as a zero sum game, they do
not take into account the intangible resources such as emotional and cultural pay off (as well as indivisible
resources). On the other hand, our simulation models do handle these added factors.
APPENDIX II: Validation
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This appendix provides a more detailed look at the runs and results between simulated vs. actual leaders and
followers.
Correspondence between Simulated vs. Actual Leader Decisions
This correspondence test has been attempted with the use of the mutual entropy statistic. Our estimation of mutual
entropy for CountryT is much less than 1, indicating that the real and simulated base cases might correspond well.
Currently, there are no benchmarks that could indicate what would be an acceptable limit of mutual entropy for
establishing correspondence. If we accepted an arbitrary limit of correspondence of mutual entropy less than or
equal to 0.1 [an order of magnitude less than the mutual entropy associated with no correspondence], then we would
be able to reject the null hypothesis of no-correspondence between real and simulated outputs. The following figure
shows a summary of decisions of the simulated and actual leaders through the bar charts on the left and right
respectively. The entropy calculations are shown below the charts.
Figure A2.1: Correlation of Simulated Leader vs. Real Action Decisions
Comparison of distributions to see Mutual Entropy (M). Reject H0 & Accept H1 if M<<0.1
PMFserv-Simulated Prime Minister’s Actions Real Leader’s Chosen Actions
Distributions

Negative

Neutral

Positive

Negative

Neutral

Positive

Mutual
Entropy
Calculations

Joint Entropy of Sim & Real
1.396 H(SIM, REAL) = - Σ p (simi, real) log p (simi, reali)
Entropy of Sim
0.681 H(SIM) = - Σ p(sim) i log p(sim)
Entropy of Real
0.760 H(REAL) = - Σ p(real) i log p(real)
Mutual Entropy of Sim & Real
0.045 M (SIM: REAL) = H(SIM) – H(SIM|REAL)
Legend of Leader Actions
Neutral Actions:
Positive Actions:
Negative Actions:
Discriminate
Perceive (Observe Events)
Give Culturally Sensitive Assistance
Suppress - Increase Number of Cops
Give Essential Assistance
Suppress - Increase Violence of Cops
Reduce Suppress by Number
Reduce Suppress by Violence
Villager Behavior Correspondence

We have employed Kendall’s Tau to relate the real vs. simulated population’s grievance data. Kendall's Tau is a
measure of correlation, and so measures the strength of the relationship between two variables. It employs paired
observations, and is scale-free. It is computed as the excess of concordant over discordant (nd) pairs, divided by a
term representing the geometric mean between the number of pairs not tied on variable 1 and the number not tied on
variable 2. There is no well-defined intuitive meaning for Tau -b, which is the surplus of concordant over discordant
pairs as a percentage of concordant, discordant, and approximately one-half of tied pairs. We obtained two sets of
Kendall’s Tau (KT) values by comparing:
• simulated agent grievances from each base case simulation against every other base case simulation, and
• real population incident severities against the simulated grievances from every base case simulations.
Figure A2.2: Pairwise Comparison of Base Case Simulations and Real Data
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Kendall’s Tau for EACH
base case grievance,
against EVERY OTHER
base case grievance. As has
been illustrated in the left
of the Figure A2.2, each
base case simulation output
was pitted against every
other base case output. For
each base case simulation,
the Kendall’s Tau obtained
with every other base case
is averaged to obtain a
value of KT for that given
base case.
Then, we plotted the
average frequency of
occurrence of KT values,
obtained by binning the KT
values into one of the bins
shown in the figure. We
compared visually the two
sets of Kendall’s Taus
obtained as above. This
comparison gave structural
independence, and was
similar to the “jackknifing” technique.
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Distribution of P Values from Kendall Tau Tests between:
(1) Real Event Data Vs Base Case Simulations, and
(2) Base Case Vs Base Case Simualtions

Distribution of Kendall Tau Values from Comparision between:
(1) Real Event Data Vs Base Case Simulations, and
(2) Base Case Vs Base Case Simualtions

0.600
1.200

1.000

Probability

Probability

0.500

0.400

0.300

0.800

0.600

0.400

0.200
0.200

0.100
Bin 6: [0.35-1]

Bin 5: [0.25-0.35]

Bin 4: [0.2-0.25]

Bin 3: [0.1-0.2]

Bin 2: [0.05-0.1]

Bin 6: [0.75-1]

Bin 5: [0.5-0.75]

Bin 4: [0.25-0.5]

Bin 3: [0-0.25]

Bin 2: [-0.25-0]

Bin 1: [-1--0.25]

Bin 1: [0-0.05]

0.000

0.000

Bins of Kendall's Tau Values
Bins of P Values
KT: Data (MV_AVG_Comb_Fatality_Injury_Score_10) Vs Base (MvAvgExp2)
P: Data (MV_AVG_Comb_Fatality_Injury_Score_10) Vs Base (MvAvgExp2)

KT: Base (MvAvgExp2) Vs Base (MvAvgExp2)
P: Base (MvAvgExp2) Vs Base (MvAvgExp2)

Figure A2.3a: Distribution of Kendall’s Tau for
Data and Base Simulation

Figure A2.3b: Distribution of p Values for Data and
Base Simulation

It can be seen that KT values among base cases with moving averages are distributed in bins 3 (0.0-0.25), 4
(0.25-0.50), and - 6 (0.75-1.0), with proportions increasing in that order. This implies that a large majority of the
pairwise comparisons (a little over half) among base cases result in high Kendall’s Taus, while a smaller fractions
have limited correlation.
Comparisons between real data (injury-fatality aggregated and smoothened, of course) and base cases (moving
averages) are found in bins 3 (0.0-0.25) and 4 (0.25-0.50). This shows that all base cases show positive correlation
with real data. A Kendall’s Tau of 0.25 or 0.5 might appear to be a small correlation compared to a KT value of, say,
1.0, but in reality, these numbers indicate a fairly good degree of correlation, especially considering this is a time
series and any mismatch would be counted as discordance resulting in negative correlation. This is illustrated by
converting Kendall’s Tau to p values, as seen below. Although the real data is an outlier, it is no more outlier than
about half the simulation base cases themselves.
While we recognize that the p values are considered weak in the case of Kendall’s Tau, and therefore exercise
caution in the interpretations, it is hard to not notice p values for the same Kendall’s Tau. The range of p values from
the models run is less than 5%. If one were to take the approach of significance level, this would mean that one
would be able to reject the hypothesis of mutual independence between the base case simulation grievance and
observed incidents (villager or follower decisions) with a significance level of 0.05. With a two-sided test, we are
considering the possibility of concordance or discordance (akin to positive or negative correlation). In our example,
we can conclude with reservation (weak indicator, and hence the caution) that there is a statistically significant lack
of independence between base case simulation and observed grievances rankings. That is, real incident data and
simulation results are related. (From these range of results, and based on the alpha value of 5%, it seems reasonable
to reject the null hypothesis).
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